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Summary 
Human capital flows can take several forms and include the 
international circulation of scientists, information technology experts, 
intellectuals, artists and entrepreneurs. The evidence shows that 
traditional “brain drain”, say a permanent and irreversible outflow of 
human capital, co-exists also with cycles of emigration and return of 
national talent (“brain circulation”). Thus, for developing countries, 
the emigration of domestic talent need not be always a permanent loss. 
However, although return rates vary from country to country, poor 
economies suffer particularly hard from the emigration of domestic 
talent. 
The empirical evidence point-out to a very unequal distribution 
of world resources in science and technology that mimics also large 
disparities in per capita income across nations. Rich countries spend 
more (as a share of GDP) in science in technology than middle income 
and poor countries. However, there are some significant outliers such 
as China and India whose ratios of spending in science and technology 
(S &T) to GDP are significantly higher than the international average 
corresponding to their income per capita levels. These international 
differentials in resources devoted to S&T is correlated with the 
observed outflows of scientists and technology experts from 
developing countries/transition economies to the U.S. and other OECD 
countries where they find more resources (included better pay) to 
carry out their scientific research and technology work. 
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Policies to stem the outflow of human capital and entrepreneurship require action at several 
fronts: national governments of developing countries need to give a greater priority and devote 
more resources to science, technology and knowledge generation at home recognizing its pay-off in 
enhanced productivity, competitiveness and long-run development. Less bureaucracy and more 
friendly policies to business creation helps also to stem the outflow of entrepreneurial talent. 
Developed countries in turn can increase the transfer of knowledge to LDCs and redefine foreign 
aid priorities towards science and technology in developing countries. 
These national and international public sector effort in S&T can be complemented by grants 
from international foundations to support science and technology in developing countries 
supporting for example the creation, of centers of excellence among other initiatives. All this would 
be a powerful signal to stem the outflow of talent away from the developing world. 
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I. Introduction1 
The last decade has seen an increase in the international 
mobility of highly skilled, talented individuals (i.e. human capital) in 
response to the expansion of the knowledge economy accompanying 
globalization. 
The topic of human capital mobility and brain drain has 
remained somewhat dormant in the academic and policy literature in 
the last two to three decades after being actively debated in the 1960s. 
Two views dominated the positions of that time: one was the 
“internationalist view” championed by Harry Johnson. The alternative 
view was the “nationalist view” exposed by Don Patinkin and others. 
The “internationalists” favored unrestricted international migration of 
highly skilled individuals as a vehicle to enhance “global efficiency,” 
while the “nationalists” were concerned with the adverse impact on 
national development of human capital outflows to advanced 
economies. In the world of the early 21 century the debate is better 
framed in terms of the contribution of international mobility of human 
capital to global knowledge creation and dissemination, global 
inequality, national development and successful post-socialist 
transition. 
The international movement of human capital (HC) can be 
identified, in practice, as the movement of scientists, engineers (e.g. in 
the information sector), executives, and other professionals across 
 
                                                     
1  Paper presented at the 4th Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) for Europe held in Oslo, Norway 
on June 24-26, 2002. Efficient assistance by Claudio Aravena in the preparation of this paper is appreciated. 
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frontiers. These are people with special talents, high skills and specialized knowledge in the 
scientific, technological and cultural areas. Another dimension of the international mobility of 
talent is entrepreneurial migration, say people with talent for business creation and resource 
mobilization rather than necessarily individuals with a high stock of formal education. 
From the viewpoint of developing countries (and transition economies) the international 
mobility of HC has been seen with a mix of concern and possibility. On the one hand developing 
countries encourage national students to earn graduate degrees abroad (typically in the U.S. and 
Europe) in science, technology and other disciplines as a way to upgrade their knowledge and 
human resource base. On the other hand, when outstanding scientists and professionals stay abroad, 
the concern arises of a “brain drain” due to the flight of scarce human capital and talent whose 
contribution is needed for economic development at home. 
Albeit this work was initially undertaken from a Latin American perspective, the issues 
analyzed are global by their very nature, and are of interest to all developing countries. 
This paper deals with several topics related to the international flows of human capital 
mainly from a developing countries perspective. It discusses main facts and trends in the 
international mobility of human capital, assessing the world distribution of science and technology 
resources, the economic peculiarities of human capital migration, the issue of brain drain and brain 
circulation, the existence of scientific diasporas and entrepreneurial migration. The paper also 
discusses the impact of human capital migration on global inequality and national development and 
highlights policies to induce human capital repatriation and greater sharing by developing countries 
(and transition economies) in the benefits of global knowledge creation. 
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II. Facts and trends in the 
international mobility of human 
capital 
The demand for skilled individuals has been on the rise in the 
last decade or so. The main pole of attraction for foreign skilled 
people is the United States. Some 40 percent of its foreign –born 
population have tertiary education levels. Since the early 1990s some 
900,000 skilled professionals mainly Informational Technology (IT) 
specialists have emigrated to the United States coming from India, 
China, Russia and some OECD countries (U.K., Germany, Canada). 
These immigrants often come under the H1-B visa program for highly 
skilled professionals. 
The U.S. is also a main recruiter of foreign students in higher 
education (it accounts for 32 % of all foreign students in the OECD 
countries)1. Higher education is an important channel for recruiting 
high skill personnel and 25 percent of H1-B visa holders in 1999 were 
students previously enrolled in U.S. universities. 
The U.S. is not the only net importer of foreign talent. Germany, 
in 2000, launched a sort of “green card” scheme to recruit some 
20,000 foreign IT specialists. The main recruiters come from Russia, 
Poland and other Eastern European nations that have an important 
pool of scientific and technical specialist trained during the socialist 
period and afterwards. Similar initiatives have been launched, 
 
                                                     
1 See OECD Observer (2002). 
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recently, in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand (see Box 1). In the developing world, Singapore has 
been meeting shortages of IT specialists with immigrants from Malaysia, China and other 
neighboring countries. 
The magnitude and impact on developing countries of the outflow of human capital varies 
from region to region. In Africa, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), estimates that 
around 300,000 professionals live and work in Europe and North America. Sending countries 
include Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Ghana and others. Casual evidence shows that as a 
consequence of the large scale emigration of medical doctors in Africa, the poor are forced to seek 
medical treatment from traditional healers while the rich elite fly to London for their routine 
medical checkups2. A recent study3 shows that Africa is losing as much as US$ 4 billions a year 
due to the emigration of top professionals seeking better jobs abroad. The study argues that about 
20,000 professionals leave Africa each year. This emigration of professionals in Africa has several 
adverse effects such as reducing the stock of scarce human capital at home, the erosion of the 
domestic tax base, the failure to form a middle-class of educated people, a stabilizing factor in most 
societies. 
In higher per capita income developing countries the consequences of the outflow of human 
capital could to be less dramatic. In China the Ministry of Science and Technology estimates that 
most internet-based ventures were started by Chinese returnees from the United States. In Taipei 
(Taiwan), half of all the companies emerging from the largest scientific park in Taiwan, the 
Hsinchu, have been started by returnees from the United States. In India, however, in the year 
2000, it was estimated that some 1,500 highly qualified Indians returned from the United States, 
although more than 30 times that number depart each year (OECD, 2002). 
The outflow of human capital is not only led by better opportunities for study and work in 
the developed countries (pulling factors) but also by economic and political conditions at home 
(pushing factors). In Latin America a massive exodus of professionals, scientists and intellectuals 
took place in the late 1960s and the 1970s. In those years, military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile and others countries targeted universities and other academic centers for 
ideological cleansing and to abate sources of internal opposition and criticism. This experience 
suggests a direct correlation between the emigration of scientists and intellectuals and the existence 
of authoritarian regimes that suppress civil liberties and curtail academic freedom. The restoration 
of democracy in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s led to some return of scientists and 
intellectuals, although this flow would have been probably larger if the economic conditions in 
universities and research centers --salaries and resources available for research-- were better4. 
There seems to be no clear relationship between political, academic freedoms and democracy and 
resources devoted to universities and research activity. This can be illustrated by the recent 
experience of post-socialist countries such as Russia, Poland and others. In these countries, 
particularly Russia, the end of communism and the transition to markets and democracy in the 
1990s has coincided with a net outflow of skilled professionals, scientists and information 
technology specialists5. For example in Russia it is estimated that around 1,000-2,000 people 
employed in "science and scientific services" have left Russia since the early 1990s. Germany and 
Israel account for 86% of the Russian emigrants in this category in 2000 (Gokhberg and 
Nekipelova 2002). The outflow of scientists in Russia is largely attributed due to a squeeze in the 
budget of the science and technology sector that cut salaries, research budgets and deteriorated 
                                                     
2 The Africa Journal (2002). 
3 Aredo, D. (2002). 
4 See Pellegrino, A. and J. Martinez (2001); also Hansen et.al. (2002). 
5 For an interesting albeit dramatic account of how emigration of the most talented individuals of the German Democratic Republic 
used as a state policy during communism to get rid of active opposition and discontent, debilitated so much the GDR contributing to 
its unexpectedly rapid after demise the end of the communist regime in 1990, see Hirschman (1995). 
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working conditions in the S&T sector. This, along with changes in legislation that recognized the 
right of national citizens to take employment abroad (a right restricted under communism), seems 
to be an important variable explaining the outflow of scientists and professionals from Russia since 
the early 1990s (Gokhberg and Nekipelova, 2002). 
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III. The world distribution of science 
and technology resources 
An important determinant of the international migration of 
scientists and technology experts is the availability of resources to 
conduct research, including higher salary levels for researchers, in 
receipt countries relative to those at home. 
Assessing the volume of resources devoted to science and 
technology present various statistical and definition problems. They 
range from the definition of science, which in the Anglo-Saxon world 
is meant to cover only natural sciences (physics, biology, etc.) to the 
non-reporting of research and development (R&D) expenditure in 
poorer developing countries that makes more difficult international 
comparisons6. Intertemporal and international comparisons of 
resources devoted to science and technology in former socialist 
countries and western economies is also difficult due to different 
definitions of S&T activities (and national output) used during the 
socialist period. 
With these caveats in mind, the available information shows 
very large disparities in the world distribution of resources devoted to 
science and technology (S&T) between developed economies on one 
side and developing countries (and transition economies) on the other. 
 
                                                     
6 UNESCO and OECD have developed a broad concept of “science and technology activities” ( STA) which includes R&D, 
“scientific and technical services” (STS), and “scientific and technical education and training” (STET). STS covers activities in 
museums, libraries, translation and editing of Science and Technology (S&T) literature, surveying and prospecting, testing and 
quality control, etc. STET refers to S&T education and training, notably tertiary education (see UNESCO, 2001, pp.2). 
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In fact, according to UNESCO (2001) the developing countries that account for 78 % of 
world population (and 39 % of world GDP) only contributed to 16 percent of global research and 
development (R&D) expenditure in 1996/97. In contrast, the developed economies with 22% of 
world population account for some 84 percent of global R&D expenditure, (see table I and figure 
1). 
According to table I the U.S has the largest share of world R&D expenditure: 36.4 percent in 
1996/97. The European Union accounts for 25.2 percent and Japan 15.2 percent. In the developing 
world, China accounts for 3.9 percent, of world R&D expenditure; the Newly Industrialized 
Countries of South-East Asia 4.9 percent; India 2.0 percent and Latin America and the Caribbean 
3.1 percent. Particularly low shares in global R&D spending are found in Russia: 1 percent and in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.5 percent. 
Another indicator of the domestic effort in science and technology is as the share of GDP 
devoted to R& D. This coefficient ranges from 2.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the U.S. to 
0.9 in Russia, 0.5 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 0.3 percent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (see figure 3). 
There is also a significantly lower availability of resources (i.e. salaries, research budgets, 
equipment) per researcher in the developing countries and transition economies than in industrial 
countries (see figure 4)7. For instance while in Russia the average R&D expenditure per researcher 
was U$ 10,000 (in purchasing power parity dollars) in 1996/97, that ratio was U$ 167,000 in the 
European Union, and U$ 203,000 in the United States. These are ratios of 1 to 17 and 1 to 20. In 
Latin America the R&D spending per researcher is U$ 48,000 and in the Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries U$ 111,000, all in PPP dollars (see table I and figure 4). 
These indicators point-out to a very unequal distribution of world resources in science and 
technology that mimics also large disparities in per capita income across nations. Rich countries 
spend more (as a share of GDP) in science in technology than middle income and poor countries. 
However, there are some significant outliers such as China and India whose ratios of spending in 
science and technology to GDP are significantly higher than the international average 
corresponding to their income per capita levels. These international differentials in resources 
devoted to S&T must be correlated with the observed outflows of scientists and technology experts 
from developing countries/transition economies to the U.S. and other OECD countries where they 
find more resources (included better pay) to carry out their scientific research and technology work. 
                                                     
7 The number of researchers of the developing countries as a share of world total 28 percent is above their corresponding share of 
world R&D expenditure (16 percent), see table I and figure 2. 
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IV. Matching, complementarities 
increasing returns and the 
productivity of human capital 
As already mentioned high skill and talented people leave their 
home countries for a variety of reasons: the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge and first rate education in the best centers of the world 
(education phase), the lure of interacting with peers of international 
recognition, the aim of pursuing a successful career abroad. 
In scientific work (generation of new knowledge) individual 
researchers benefit from interacting with a critical mass of other 
researchers and scientists working in the same field. Intellectual 
creation is rarely a purely individual endeavor: interactions with peers 
is a critical ingredient of the creative process. 
Human capital depends, positively, on the availability of human 
capital, in other words there are increasing returns in knowledge 
creation. In the decision to emigrate physicists seek other physicists, 
biologists seek other biologists, economists seek other economists, etc. 
Matching, complementarities and increasing returns are thus an 
essential part of the story of emigration of human capital. As the 
literature on growth and development emphasizes this can lead to 
virtuous circles and also to poverty traps8. Receiving countries can set 
in motion a cycle of vigorous knowledge creation and application by 
 
                                                     
8 See Easterly (2001) and ECLAC (2002). 
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attracting the most talented from abroad, who combine with an often strong knowledge base in the 
host country. Conversely, sending countries can enter in a phase of stagnation in the development 
of science, technology and knowledge following the outflows of talent as a critical mass of 
scientists and technical experts disappear, deteriorating the milieu for knowledge generation and 
assimilation at home. 
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V. Brain drain or brain cycle? The 
human capital emigration-return 
cycle 
The possibility of virtuous cycles of knowledge creation along 
with "knowledge traps" associated with the international mobility of 
human capital depend also on the nature of the emigration-return 
process. Empirical evidence on foreign students studying and working 
after graduation in the United States, provided by the U.S. National 
Science Foundation, seems to show a pattern that combines a “brain 
cycle” with "brain drain"9. The “brain cycle” would be roughly the 
following: a foreign student comes to study abroad (in a developed 
country, for example the U.S.) to earn a graduate degree, Master or 
Ph.D. After graduation, talented students, from MBAs to scientists, 
very often get good job offers in the host country. 
Thus, the foreign student chooses to remain abroad after 
completing higher education. The duration of the stay abroad can 
range from a few years, a decade to eventual retirement. If after a few 
years of work abroad the individual returns home, the emigration of 
human capital can be understood more as a "brain cycle" and not an 
irreversible loss. 
In the case that the emigrant decides to stay abroad during his 
whole productive life the loss for the sending country is larger and the  
 
                                                     
9 See National Science Foundation (1998). 
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situation resembles more the "brain drain" symptom. To what extent the home country erodes its 
qualified human resource pool due to the student decision to remain abroad after graduation? In a 
world of lower transport costs and easy communications the talented individual living abroad may 
maintain contact and professional exchange with its peers at home, including periodic visits to his 
native country thus contributing (indirectly or directly) to national development in his or her area of 
expertise. 
The data of the NSF study shows that about 47 percent of the foreign student on temporary visas 
who earned doctorates in 1990 and 1991 were working in the United States in 1995. In turn, the 
majority of the foreign doctoral recipients in 1990-91 coming from India (79 percent) and China 
(88 percent) were still working in the U.S. in 1995. In contrast, only 11 percent of South-Koreans 
who completed science and engineering doctorates from U.S. universities in 1990-91 were working 
in the U.S. in 1995 (see tables II and III). 
In turn, the NSF study reports that foreign doctoral recipients in science and engineering that 
were working in the U.S. after 10 or 20 years tend to remain in the country (no significant net 
return migration). The point is that we seem to observe a “human capital emigration–return cycle” 
(brain cycle) whose shape (duration of stay-rates) varies from country of origin. Understanding 
better the determinants of stay-rates is another important subject for future research. 
 
CEPAL - SERIE Macroeconomía del desarrollo N° 15 
19 
 
VI. Scientific diasporas 
Diasporas, coming from the Greek diaspeirein, mean dispersion, 
scattering. The term is often associated with people and communities 
dispersed from their home country for various reasons: wars, political 
and/or ethnic persecutions at home, natural disasters, economic 
disasters (famines) and other causes10. Diasporas often tend to 
maintain emotional, historical, family attachments with their 
homeland. 
Recent literature11 has identified "scientific diasporas". These 
diasporas, that maintain an attachment to their home countries, create 
knowledge networks of nationals belonging to a certain scientific field 
that work or study abroad. 
A main purpose of these networks is to connect professionals 
and scientists scattered around the globe who are interested in 
maintaining contact among themselves. In addition, they are also 
interested in helping to promote the scientific and economic 
development of their home countries. These networks may have a link 
with national governments or be fully independent. Examples of these 
networks are the Chinese Scholars Abroad (CHISA), The Colombian 
 
 
                                                     
10 See Shuval, J. (2000). 
11 See Meyer and Brown (1999). 
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Network of Engineers Abroad (Red Caldas), The Global Korean Network, The Syllicon Valley 
Indian Professionals Association (SIPA), and several others.12  
Scientific knowledge generation taking place in the world to networks, in principle, de-link 
the contribution of scientists to their physical residence in the home country and thus can be in 
interesting vehicle for transferring developing countries. 
 
                                                     
12 Other examples are the Polish Scientists Abroad Network, the Reverse Brain Drain Project of Thailand, the Tunisian Scientific 
Consortium, the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), The Program of Venezuelan Talent Abroad and several others. 
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VII. Entrepreneurial migration 
An important feature of migration, relatively neglected in the 
discussions of brain drain, is the international mobility of 
entrepreneurship. This is people that settle in other countries—
developed and developing—and have a talent for business creation 
and job generation. Historically, world-wide successful entrepreneurs 
and bankers in the late 19th and early 20th century in the United States 
and Europe such as Mellon, Vanderbilt, Carnegie, Rockefeller, the 
famous banking dynasty of the Rostchilds with operations in London, 
Zurich and other financial centers were foreign-born or first descents 
of immigrants13. In this case, it is interesting to note that the Mellons, 
Rockefellers and others, besides accumulating a large wealth, had an 
interest in creating centers of education and learning. In fact, they 
helped to establish universities and created private foundations 
devoted to education purposes. 
Carnegie in particular, was one of the pioneers in the formation 
of the system of public libraries in the United States at the turn of the 
20th century. Later on, names such as George Soros, an immigrant 
from Central Europe escaping nazi persecution in the 1930s, turned 
abroad into a very successful financier. Soros is another  case of a 
talented entrepreneur with a philanthropic gist manifested in creation 
of the Soros Foundation and the network of Open Society Institutes 
throughout the world. 
                                                     
13 See Ferguson (1999). 
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Some studies have observed a connection between ethnic diasporas and entrepreneurship14, 
(see box 2). Classic examples of this, is the Jewish emigration to the United States. In fact, it is 
estimated that the contribution of the Jewish community in America to business creation and 
banking is far larger than their share in the total population of the U.S. In the context of developing 
countries, Chinese emigration has played an important role in building a business community (of 
Chinese origin) in several very dynamic economies of South – East Asia. In turn, immigration from 
Germany, Italy, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon to Argentina, Chile, Brazil at the turn of the 20th century, 
played a very important role in building the textile sector, banking, agriculture, mining sectors in 
these Latin American countries15. 
There is considerable variation in the scale of the business activity created by the 
entreprenuership of foreign migrants. Not all entrepreneur immigrants operate at the economic 
scale of the Rockefellers, Rotschilds or Soros. There is, indeed, a plethora of them operating at the 
level of family business and small firms. A typical example is the ethnic restaurants (e.g. Chinese 
cuisine, Indian cuisine, Brazilian cuisine, French cuisine, Italian cuisine etc.) in the large cities of 
the developed countries. 
Moreover in the carpet and furniture business in these cities there is a predominance of 
Turkish, Indian, Pakistani, Moroccan owners. This pattern of immigrant entrepreneurship do not 
mobilize large amounts of financial resources but they can be quite labor intensive and their 
business add to services variety in the host countries. The sociological profile of these endeavors is 
interesting: business are usually owned and run by members of a specific ethnic group and the 
employees (many times family members) tend to be also of the same ethnicity16. 
The connections between ethnicity, entrepreneurship and migration and their patterns of 
integration/exclusion with the local economy and society are themes that deserve further inquire. 
The relationship between endowments of human capital and entrepreneurship is also an 
interesting subject. Entrepreneurs are not necessarily people with a high stock of formal education; 
in addition, the “ psychology of the entrepreneur” is certainly different from that of the scientist or 
the intellectual who we usually identify with “human capital”. Typically the entrepreneur is prone 
to risk-taking, has a talent for combining capital, labor and for entertaining a vision of opportunities 
and the prospects for profits17. In contrast, professionals, scientists engineers are often employees 
rather than owners and are supposed to be more risk averse. 
 
                                                     
14 See Kloosterman and Rath (2000). 
15 See Solberg, C.E. (1970). 
16 See Ndoen, M. Gorter, C. Nijkamp and P. Rietveld (2000) and Kloosterman and J. Rath (2001). 
17 See Schumpeter (1954). 
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VIII. Impact on global output, global 
inequality and national 
development 
What are the economic consequences of the international 
mobility of human capital and talent? Who gain? Who losses? 
In a world without barriers to the movement of people across 
nations, individuals should be expected to migrate from places where 
their productivity (and income) is lower to places where their 
productivity is higher, regardless of national borders.18 
Then, human capital will go from lower net returns to higher net 
return places discounted the costs of moving (including some 
psychological costs of leaving home). Unless there are some 
significant negative externalities, “world income” should be higher 
with more mobile human capital as at the margin the marginal 
productivity of human capital will be equalized around the world. 
This, however, does not consider the distributional impact of such 
migrations flows between sending and receiving nations. 
We live in a world of large disparities in levels of per capita 
income across countries19 and the movement of human capital from 
low income countries to rich nations may tend to accentuate these 
income per capita differentials. In fact, the emigration of the highly 
skilled increases the stock of human capital in advanced receiving 
 
                                                     
18 This is a simplification since individual attachments to family, language, traditions and culture in the home country also matter in 
the decision to emigrate. 
19 See Solimano (2001a). 
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countries and reduces it in lower per capita income (sending) countries. If, as mentioned before, 
there are increasing returns in human capital and it tends to concentrate in places where the 
availability of human and physical capital is already high the result may be an unequalizing process 
of income and knowledge concentration across countries that tend to be persistent over time. Under 
increasing returns, the international mobility of talent and human capital from poor to rich 
countries may exacerbate global inequalities.20 
The impact of the outflows of human capital on national development of the sending 
countries can be negative in the short run as these outflows deprive the home country of their 
contribution to science, productivity and ultimately domestic output, reduce a source of revenues 
and weakens the middle class. In the medium and long runs things can improve. National talent 
may return home after years of work abroad, as in the "brain circulation "model sketched above, 
and the greater circulation of human capital can yield other benefits to developing nations. 
 
                                                     
20 See Krugman and Venables (1995) for a center-periphery model with increasing returns. 
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IX. Policy issues 
What can developing countries do to revert the outflow of 
human capital? How to increase their share in the process of global 
generation of knowledge? How to improve the world distribution of 
resources for science and technology? 
A first point is to recognize that legal impediments for 
international migration of human capital and/or stiff taxation of those 
flows are unlikely to succeed and can be ultimately counter-
productive. Those measures are likely to stifle individual preferences 
for mobility and dampen the motivation of scientists, technical experts 
and other skilled individuals. In the era of globalization and rapid 
technical change the international mobility of human capital is 
unavoidable21. The crucial point is how to create better economic and 
professional conditions for the high skilled and talented to return 
home, after studying or working abroad. The data shows that the share 
of GDP devoted to R&D in many developing countries is well below 
world averages. This reflects the existence of other priorities for 
resource allocation such as physical infrastructure and social spending 
over the development of science and technology. In the medium to 
long run, the neglect on the science and technology sector is likely to 
be reflected in lower productivity growth and competitiveness, 
hampering the development potential of these countries. 
 
 
                                                     
21 Solimano (1999b). 
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There is a role also for foreign aid in the area of science and technology to developing 
countries. Foreign aid in S&T can take several forms: support for universities and high-quality 
research centers in LDCs to enhance research capabilities and induce the repatriation of scientists 
and professionals. Another mechanism is creating programs of international exchange of scientists 
in which technical experts of developed countries can spend time in developing countries 
interacting with local researchers, thus contributing to the local development of the science and 
technology sector. The use of the internet and support for local libraries in upgrading their 
collections of books, data bases, specialized journals and the like are concrete measures to help in 
this area. 
This aid can be channeled bilaterally or through international organizations such as 
UNESCO, The World Bank, OECD and others. Currently, the World Bank has a lending program 
for supporting the development of science in LDCs through the Millenium Science Initiative (MSI). 
The loans go to national governments that  provide matching funds and give financial support -
often through grants- to the formation and maintenance of "centers of excellence" in science in 
their countries. There is a role also for international private support of science and technology in 
developing nations through private foundations with an international scope such as Ford 
Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and others. These 
foundations can  target programs in pure and applied science for development. The Gates 
Foundation’s support development of vaccines and cost efficient drugs for Africa seems to be an 
excellent precedent in this regard. 
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X. Concluding remarks 
The globalization of human capital and talent is an inescapable 
feature of globalization, the expansion of the knowledge economy and 
the rapid pace of technical change of today's world. 
Our paper shows that there are large disparities in the world 
distribution of resources of science and technology between developed 
countries on one hand and developing countries and transition 
economies on the other. In fact the economies of the OECD account 
for near 85 percent of world expenditure in research and development. 
This concentration of resources in the S&T sector in advanced 
economies is positively correlated with the outflows of human capital 
from developing countries and transition economies to the developed 
world. 
Human capital flows can take several forms and include the 
international circulation of scientists, information technology experts, 
intellectuals, artists and entrepreneurs. The evidence shows that 
traditional “brain drain”, say a permanent and irreversible outflow of 
human capital, co-exists also with cycles of emigration and return of 
national talent (“brain circulation”). Thus, for developing countries, 
the emigration of domestic talent need not be always a permanent loss. 
However, although return rates vary from country to country; and poor 
regions such as Africa suffer particularly hard from the almost 
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The historical and recent evidence of Latin America and some post-socialist countries 
indicates a complex relationship between democracy and the emigration of scientists and 
intellectuals. In Latin America the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, that suppressed 
civil liberties and restricted academic freedoms, led to outflows of scientists and intellectuals. 
Some of them returned with the advent of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast in post-
soviet Russia, the transition to democracy and the market has coincided with outflows of skilled 
professionals and scientist due to a squeeze in the budgets for science and technology activities in 
Russia. 
Current imbalances in the international distribution of resources for science and technology 
calls for more resources and better incentives for the science and technology sector in developing 
countries and transition economies. This requires action at several fronts: national governments of 
developing countries need to give a greater priority to science, technology and knowledge 
generation at home recognizing its pay-off in enhanced productivity, competitiveness and long-run 
development. Developed countries in turn can increase the transfer of knowledge to LDCs and 
redefine foreign aid priorities towards science and technology in developing countries. These 
national and international public sector effort in S&T can be complemented by grants from 
international foundations to support science and technology in developing countries supporting for 
example the creation, of centers of excellence among other initiatives. All this would be a powerful 
signal to stem the outflow of talent away from the developing world. 
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Table I 
KEY INDICATORS ON WORLD GDP, POPULATION AND R&D EXPENDITURE 
AND PERSONNEL, 1996/97 
 GDP Population R&D expenditure (GERD) R&D researchers  
            GERD per 
Regions/ Billion % world Million % world Billion % world % GDP GERD per Researchers Researchers Researchers researcher 
      countries PPP$ GDP  Population PPP$ GERD  inhabitant (thousands) % world per million
(thousand
s 
        (PPP$)  total inhabitants PPP$) 
WORLD 34381.9 100.0 5483.3 100.0 546.7 100.0 1.6 100.0 5189.4 100.0 946.0 105.4 
Developing countries 13366.8 38.9 4258.9 77.7 85.5 15.6 0.6 20.0 1476.2 28.4 347.0 57.9 
Developed countries 21015.1 61.1 1224.4 22.3 461.3 84.4 2.2 377.0 3713.3 71.6 3033.0 124.2 
             
Americas 11333.8 33.0 782.2 14.3 225.8 41.3 2.0 289.0 1410.5 27.2 1803.0 160.1 
North America 8169.0 23.8 295.1 5.4 209.0 38.2 2.6 708.0 1062.2 20.5 3599.0 196.8 
Latin America and the 3164.8 9.2 487.1 8.9 16.8 3.1 0.5 34.0 348.3 6.7 715.0 48.2 
Caribbean             
             
Europe 9186.0 26.7 714.2 13.0 157.7 28.8 1.7 221.0 1768.2 34.1 2476.0 89.2 
European Union 7404.4 21.5 373.1 6.8 137.9 25.2 1.8 370.0 824.9 15.9 2211.0 167.2 
Central and Eastern 679.2 2.0 115.4 2.1 5.6 1.0 0.8 49.0 167.5 3.2 1451.0 33.5 
Europe             
Comm. of Independent 810.4 2.4 213.5 3.9 7.6 1.4 0.9 35.0 733.1 14.1 3434.0 10.3 
States (in Europe)             
Other 292.0 0.8 12.2 0.2 6.6 1.2 2.3 539.0 42.7 0.8 3499.0 154.2 
             
Africa 1246.5 3.6 626.5 11.4 3.8 0.7 0.3 6.0 132.0 2.5 211.0 28.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa             
(excl. Arab States) 759.0 2.2 464.0 8.5 2.6 0.5 0.3 6.0 52.5 1.0 113.0 49.1 
Arab States (in Africa) 487.6 1.4 162.5 3.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 7.0 79.5 1.5 489.0 14.9 
             
Asia 12172.8 35.4 3331.6 60.8 152.3 27.9 1.3 46.0 1790.6 34.5 537.0 85.1 
Japan 3000.3 8.7 125.8 2.3 83.1 15.2 2.9 661.0 617.4 11.9 4909.0 134.6 
China 3542.8 10.3 1215.4 22.2 21.1 3.9 0.6 17.0 551.8 10.6 454.0 38.3 
Newly Industrialized             
Economies 2322.5 6.8 405.1 7.4 26.7 4.9 1.1 66.0 240.9 4.6 595.0 110.7 
India 1529.5 4.4 945.6 17.2 10.8 2.0 0.7 11.0 142.8 2.8 151.0 75.8 
Comm. of Independent             
States (in Asia) 168.1 0.5 71.0 1.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 8.0 97.1 1.9 1368.0 6.0 
Arab States (in Asia) 398.2 1.2 71.2 1.3 0.8 0.1 0.2 11.0 3.7 0.1 52.0 211.4 
Other 1211.3 3.5 497.5 9.1 9.3 1.7 0.8 19.0 137.0 2.6 275.0 67.6 
             
Oceania 442.8 1.3 28.7 0.5 7.2 1.3 1.6 251.0 88.3 1.7 3071.0 81.7 
             
Selected             
countries/regions             
United States 7511.3 21.8 265.2 4.8 198.8 36.4 2.6 749.0 980.5 18.9 3697.0 202.7 
Russian Federation 643.7 1.9 147.7 2.7 5.7 1.0 0.9 38.0 561.6 10.8 3801.0 10.1 
Comm. of Independent 978.5 2.8 284.5 5.2 8.2 1.5 0.8 29.0 850.8 16.4 2991.0 9.6 
States (All)             
South Africa 297.0 0.9 39.9 0.7 2.0 0.4 0.7 50.0 41.1 0.8 1031.0 49.0 
Arab States (All) 885.8 2.6 233.8 4.3 2.0 0.4 0.2 8.0 83.2 1.6 356.0 23.6 
OECD Countries 21601.0 62.8 1096.8 20.0 463.0 84.7 2.2 422.0 2822.3 54.4 2573.0 164.0 
Source: UNESCO estimates August 2000. 




PERCENTAGE OF 1990-91 FOREIGN S&E DOCTORAL RECIPIENTS FROM U.S. UNIVERSITIES WHO 
WERE WORKING IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1995, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
 Foreign Percent 
Country S&E working in the 
 doctorates United States 
   
Total 13878 47 
   
China 1/ 2779 88 
India 1235 79 
Japan 227 13 
South Korea 1912 11 
Taiwan 1824 42 
England 142 59 
Germany 177 35 
Greece 240 41 
Canada 417 46 
Mexico 194 30 
1/ The high stay rate of Chinese students is attributable to a one-time granting of permanent residence status in the United 
States (Chinese Students Protection Act) following China's response to student demonstrations 
Note: Includes foreign doctoral recipients with temporaryvisa status at the time of receipt of degrees in 1990-1991 (not 
permanent residents). 
Source: NSF, 1998. 




CHINESE STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD AND RETURNING 
1978-99 
Year No. of students  No. of students  
 studying abroad returning 
     
1978 860 248 
1980 2124 162 
1985 4888 1424 
1986 4676 1388 
1987 4703 1605 
1988 3786 3000 
1989 3329 1753 
1990 2950 1593 
1991 2900 2069 
1992 6540 3611 
1993 10742 5128 
1994 19071 4230 
1995 20381 5750 
1996 20905 6570 
1997 22410 7130 
1998 17622 7379 
1999 23749 7748 
Source: OECD 2002. 
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Canada (Quebec Province): The provincial government of Quebec is offering five-
year income tax holidays (credits) to attract foreign academics in IT, engineering, health
science and finance to take employment in the provinces’ universities. 
European Union: As a follow-up to the Bologna Charter on education, efforts are
under way to harmonize educational certification and qualification systems among member
states in order to encourage greater student mobility within the EU. 
Finland: The government has taken steps to encourage the enrolment of foreign
students in Finland, including from Asia. 
France: Several recent measures seek to facilitate the temporary migration of
foreign scientists and researchers. In 1998, the government established an agency,
EduFrance, with a budget of FRF 100 million to attract a greater number of students to
France, particularly from Asia and Latin America. 
Germany: The government seeks to increase foreign student inflows through grants
and fellowships schemes. In addition, it launched a program to issue 20000 immigration
visas to fill IT job vacancies. In the second quarter, only one-third of the visas had been
granted, mainly to people from India and Eastern Europe who were hired by small firms. 
Ireland: The shortage of skilled workers, especially in IT, has led to government
campaigns in 2000 and 2001 to attract foreign workers as well as former Irish emigrants.
Government-sponsored job fairs have been held in Canada, the Czech Republic, India,
South Africa and the United States. In addition, work visas were introduced in 2000
specifically to allow the entry of highly skilled workers in areas where shortages exist in
Ireland (MacEinri, 2001). 
Japan: The government seeks to double the number of foreign students through the
use of scholarships. 
United Kingdom: In 1999, the UK government launched a major campaign to
increase the number of international students in higher education from 198000 to 248000.
The strategy is based on: i) a promotional/marketing campaign; ii) streamlining of visa
procedures and rules on employment for foreign students; and iii) special scholarships for
top achievers. 
United States: The US Congress has temporarily increased the annual cap on the
number of temporary visas granted to professional immigrants under the H-1B visa program
whose statutory limit in 2000 is presently set at 195000 visas per year until 2003. 
















Source: OECD (2002). 
 
According to estimates from industry sources, there are several dozen Asian venture 
capital firms in Silicon Valley – 31 from Chinese Taipei alone and others from Japan, Hong 
Kong (China), Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. Most of their money goes to start-ups that 
specialize in the Internet or semiconductors. A handful of venture funds, such as the Taipei-
based InveStar Capital Inc., founded in 1996, invest more heavily there than in Asia. In 
1998, 80% of their investments (more than USD 100 million) went to Silicon Valley firms. 
While there are no venture funds and few private financiers from the Indian subcontinent, 
the community is overflowing with local Indian investors who provide enough early funding 
to give companies the momentum to attract the attention of mainstream venture capital 
firms. As the San Francisco Bay Area’s Asian ethnic communities reached a critical mass in 
the 1990s, their networks and associations have expanded. Among the largest Chinese and 
Indian associations are the Monte Jade Science & Technology Association (1000 
members), formed in 1990 by wealthy individuals from Chinese Taipei, and the Indus 
Entrepreneurs (600 members), founded in 1993 by businessmen from South Asia. 
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